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Variable Geometry and the European Central 
Bank: How the ECB Can Assert Itself 
Against Attacks From Member 
States with Derogations 
INTRODUCTION 
Following World War II, European leaders undertook several eco-
nomic and political initiatives in an attempt to create a stable economic 
environment, as well as to fill the political power vacuum between East 
and West.! Specifically, "the architects of the European Community 
(EC) sought to create on the historically fragmented continent of 
Europe an integrated economic market that would afford enterprise 
the benefits of harmonization and economies of scale, while bringing 
to the population as a whole a higher living standard."2 
Since the establishment in 1952 of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the precursor to the present European Union (EU), the 
process of economic, legal and political integration has achieved ex-
traordinary results. 3 From a group of six states promoting free trade in 
the coal and steel sectors, the entity has grown into a union of fifteen 
members active in economic, political, social and cultural spheres.4 
Despite the progress thus far, full integration, as desired by the original 
architects, will never be realized without a complete monetary union 
and a centralized monetary policy. 
1 See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL .• CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 3 
(1993). The first of these initiatives was a Benelux customs union among Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Luxembourg. See id. The Benelux Customs Convention became effective in 1948 and 
led ten years later to the creation of a common trading area. See id. 
2Id. at 2. The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) when the Treaty 
on European Union, otherwise known as the Maastricht Treaty, came into force in November, 
1993. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992), 
31 LL.M. 247 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
3 See BERMANN, supra note 1, at 2. 
4 See id. The Treaty of Paris of April 18, 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, was signed by the three Benelux countries, France, Germany and Italy, and entered 
into force on July 25, 1952. See id. at 5. 
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In light of the objective of a complete monetary union, a revision of 
the Treaty of Rome was adopted in December, 1991 by the European 
Heads of State and Government meeting in Maastricht.5 The revision 
makes the European Monetary Union (EMU) one of the official goals 
of the Community, devises a strategy to achieve it and lays out the 
institutional framework by which EMU will be regulated.6 At the crux 
of monetary union lies the European Central Bank (ECB), the entity 
charged with maintaining price stability and general monetary order.7 
The Delors Committee, a group composed of all EC central bank 
governors plus three outside experts, aptly stated that "a new monetary 
institution would be needed because a single monetary policy cannot 
result from independent decisions and actions by different central 
banks."s Yet, the process of establishing a European central bank is not 
without impediments. 
Because of the stringent deadline for creation of the third stage of 
monetary union and establishment of the ECB, it is conceivable that 
a majority of the Member States will be left out of the institutional 
structure.9 If this were the case, it is also conceivable that these Member 
States, via the Council of Ministers, would adopt legislation contrary 
to the prerogatives of the ECB.lO If this were to happen, the ECB would 
need to assert itself against such hostile attacks from Member States 
with derogations. II 
Part I of this note will discuss the framework for formation of the 
EMU. Part II will discuss the process by which the Council of Ministers 
will assess the convergence criteria of the Member States and the 
5 See MICHELLE FRATIANNI ET AL., THE MAASTRICHT WAY TO EMU 1 (1992). 
6 See id. 
7 Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. 331 [hereinafter Protocol]. 
8 FRATIANNI ET AL., supra note 5, at 3. 
9 See EC TREATY art. 109j(3), (4). 
10 See id. The Council is the collective head of state of the European Union, deciding external 
trade policies and concluding international agreements. SeeBERMANN, supra note 1, at 51. It also 
exercises primary legislative power within the Union. See id. The Council consists of repre-
sentatives of Member State governments, voting in the name of their State with a voting strength 
crudely weighted according to the State's relative population size. See id. The Council thus 
resembles a head of state in status, a legislature in function and an assembly of constituent states 
in structure. See id. 
11 See EC TREATY art. 109j (3), (4). Member States which do not fulfill the entry criteria or are 
not politically minded to join the EMU will be given a derogation. See id. art. 109k(1). The Treaty 
states that a Member State with a derogation as well as that state's national central bank will be 
excluded from certain rights and obligations which arise from membership in the ESCB. See id. 
art. 109k(3). 
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transition to the third stage of EMU. Part III will address the govern-
ance of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB. 
Part IV will evaluate the objectives, functions and independence of the 
ESCB and the ECB. Finally, Part V will discuss how the ECB can assert 
itself against attack from Member States with derogations. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Framework for the Formation of the European Monetary Union 
In the spring of 1989, the Delors Committee, composed of all EC 
central bank governors plus three outside experts, issued a report on 
a three-stage approach for the creation of the EMU.12 The report 
recommended that economic and monetary union be achieved by a 
single process of development with three distinct stages. 13 As the Delors 
Report envisaged, the first stage began on July 1, 1990.14 This stage 
included the increased coordination of monetary and economic poli-
cies among the Member States and the strengthening and standardi-
zation of the existing European Monetary System (EMS) .15 Further-
more, Member States abolished all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between Member States and between Member States and third 
party countries. 16 
The second stage, which began on January 1, 1994, is a transitional 
stage intended to facilitate the eventual move to a common currency, 
the creation of a central bank and the implementation of a uniform 
monetary policy.17 The most important feature of this stage has been 
the establishment of the predecessor to the ECB, the European Mone-
12 See JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 203 (1992). 
13 See Coopers & Lybrand, EC Commentaries, Economic and Monetary Union, Aug. 15, 1995, at 
*4.2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand]. 
14 See DANIEL GROS & NIELS THYGESEN, EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 344 (1992). 
15 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *4.2. The EMS was established in 1978 as a direct 
response by the EC to the problems posed by the increasing instability of the dollar following the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the two oil shocks of the 1970s. See id. The primary 
goals of the EMS are to achieve a greater measure of monetary stability in the Community and 
to serve as an intermediate step towards monetary unification. See Marcello de Cecco & Alberto 
Giovannini, Does Europe Need Its Own Central Bank?, in A EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK? PERSPEC-
TIVES ON MONETARY UNIFICATION AFTER TEN YEARS OF THE EMS 1, 2 (Marcello de Cecco & 
Alberto Giovannini eds., 1989). 
16 See Christopher A. Whytock, Eurofed: Toward a European System of Central Banks and a 
European Central Bank, available in WESTLAW, database JLR. 
17 See EC TREATY art. 10ge; RALPH]. MEHNERT, USER'S GUIDE TO THE ECU 16 (1992). 
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tary Institute (EMI), which will prepare for the third stage. IS The EMI, 
located in Frankfurt, serves to facilitate the transition to the third stage 
by advising EU institutions such as the Council and the Commission, 
and by generally assisting the individual Member States in their prepa-
ration for the third stage. 19 The EMI has undertaken the creation of 
the regulatory, organizational and logistical framework necessary for 
the ESCB to perform its tasks in the third stage.20 Furthermore, the 
EMI is helping national economies achieve the fulfillment of conver-
gence criteria and is taking all necessary measures to correct persistent 
economic imbalances.21 
The third stage, which must begin by January 1,1999, will be marked 
by the transferral of all economic and monetary policy to EU institu-
tions.22 Specifically, the EU Council will be given power to decide 
economic questions and impose constraints on national budgets. 23 The 
ECB also will decide all monetary issues including exchange market 
intervention measures in third currencies and acquisition and man-
agement of the official reserves of the Member States.24 Furthermore, 
in the final stage, exchange rates will be irrevocably fixed, and a single 
currency will be introduced.25 
B. Council Assessment of Convergence Criteria and the Move to the 
Third Stage 
During the second stage, the Commission and the EMI will report 
to the Council of Ministers on the progress made in the fulfillment by 
the Member States of their obligations regarding the achievement of 
economic and monetary union. 26 These reports will include an exami-
nation of the compatibility between each Member State's national 
18 See EC TREATY art. 109f; MEHNERT, supra note 17, at 17. 
19 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *6.2. 
20 See EC TREATY art. 109f(3); MEHNERT, supra note 17, at 17. The duties of the EMI are 
manifold. See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *6.2. Specifically, the EMI will strengthen 
cooperation between the national central banks, strengthen the coordination of national mone-
tary policies to ensure price stability, monitor the functioning of the present EMS, hold consult-
ations on issues falling within the competence of the central banks and affecting the stability of 
the financial markets and facilitate the use of the ECU. See id. 
21 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *4.2. 
22 See EC TREATY arts. 109j(3)-( 4); Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *4.2; see also discussion 
infra part I(B). 
23 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *4.2. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See EC TREATY art. 109j (l) . 
1997] EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 411 
legislation and Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (Protocol) .27 Further-
more, these reports will examine the achievement of sustainable con-
vergence of national economies by reference to the fulfillment by each 
Member State of certain objective criteria.28 These criteria call for the 
achievement of a high degree of price stability, the observance of the 
normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mecha-
nism of the EMS, the achievement of a budgetary position without an 
excessive deficit and meeting standards for long-term interest rate 
levels.29 
On the basis of these reports, the Council of Ministers, acting by a 
qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, will 
assess the progress of the Member States towards meeting the strict 
convergence criteria.30 The Heads of State and Government will decide 
based on the assessments of the Council whether a majority of the 
Member States have fulfilled the necessary conditions for the adoption 
of a single currency and whether it is appropriate for the Union to 
enter the third stage ofEMU.31 If the latter question is answered in the 
affirmative, the Council will also set the date for the beginning of the 
third stage.32 If by the end of 1997 the Council has not set the date for 
27 See id. Article 107 states the important principle that the ECB, the ESCB and the Member 
State central banks shall have independence in their decision-making and are not to take 
instructions either from Union institutions or from Member States. See id. art. 107. Article 108 
states the each Member State shall ensure that its national legislation is compatible with the Treaty 
and the Protocol. See id. art. 108. 
2H See id. art.109j (1 ) . 
29 SeeEC TREATY art. 109j(l). The achievement ofa high degree of price stability is interpreted 
by the protocol on convergence criteria as meaning "an average rate of inflation, observed over 
a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1 percentage 
points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability." Id. 
The observance of the normal fluctuations margins is interpreted by the protocol as meaning 
that the Member State has respected the normal margins "without severe tensions" and has not 
devalued "on its own initiative." Id. The protocol envisages specific long-term interest-rate levels: 
"over a period of one year before the examination, a Member State has had an average nominal 
long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than two percentage points that of, at most, 
the three best performing member States in terms of price stability." Peter B. Kenen, Can the 
EMU Fly?, in GUILLERMO DE LA DENESA & PETER B. KENEN, EMU PROSPECTS: Two ESSAYS 19, 26 
(1995). 
30 See EC TREATY art. 109j (2). Qualified majority voting is addressed in Article 148 of the Treaty: 
"save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its members." Id. 
art. 148. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
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the beginning of the third stage, the stage will start automatically on 
January 1, 1999.33 
Member States which do not fulfill the entry criteria or are not 
politically minded to join the EMU will be given a derogation.34 The 
Treaty clearly expresses that a Member State with a derogation as well 
as that state's national central bank will be excluded from certain rights 
and obligations within the ESCB.35 Furthermore, the voting rights of a 
Member State with a derogation will be suspended with respect to a 
number of important provisions relating to the EMU, notably efforts to 
assure compliance with recommendations on the reduction of "exces-
sive budget deficits" and decisions on recommendations for exchange 
rate policy.36 On these matters, a qualified majority of the Council will 
be defined as two-thirds of the votes of Member States without a 
derogation. 37 Member States which have not met the convergence 
criteria but are politically ready to join EMU will have their derogation 
examined at least every two years, but they may request earlier exami-
nation.38 
The EMI will be liquidated on the date of entry into stage three, and 
its functions will be taken over by the ECB.39 Article 44 of the Protocol 
of the ESCB states that the ECB will "take over those tasks of EMI that 
because of the derogations of one or more Member States still have to 
be fulfilled ... ," and the ECB will have an advisory role in lifting 
derogations.4o Furthermore, with the beginning of the third stage, the 
EMS agreement will be implicitly abrogated among the countries that 
lock their exchange rates irrevocablyY Although the Treaty does not 
explicitly mention the position of Member States with a derogation, it 
33 See EC TREATY art. 109j(4). 
34 See id. art. 109k(1). Two protocols were adopted at Maastricht to accommodate the specific 
problems of EMU for the United Kingdom and Denmark. The first protocol allows the UK 
government to consult its parliament before deciding on whether to move to a single currency. 
See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *7.3. Similarly, the second protocol provided Denmark 
with an exemption from the EMU provisions of the Treaty. See id. According to this protocol, the 
Danish government will notiry the Council of its position concerning participation in the third 
stage of EMU before the end of 1996. See id. 
35 See EC TREATY art. 109k(3). Specifically, "a derogation ... shall entail that the following 
articles do not apply to the Member State concerned: Articles 104c(9) and (11); 105(1), (2), (3) 
and (5); 105(a); 108a; 109 and 109a(2) (b)." Id. 
36 See id. art. 109k(5); GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 424. 
37 See EC TREATY art. 109k(5); GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 424. 
38 See EC TREATY art. 109k(2). 
39 See GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 424. 
40 Protocol, supra note 7, art. 44. 
41 See GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 424. 
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strongly suggests that an EMS-like arrangement will link the currencies 
of the non-participants to the common currency of the participants in 
full EMU.42 Article 109m states that until the beginning of the third 
stage, or for as long as a Member State has a derogation, national 
exchange rate policy shall be treated as a matter of common interest.43 
C. The Governance of the European System of Central Banks and the 
European Central Bank 
The ESCB will be composed of the ECB and the national central 
banks of the Member States who have joined the final stage.44 The ECB 
will have two decision-making bodies: the Executive Board and the 
Governing Counci1.45 The Executive Board will have six members: a 
President, a Vice President and four other members of recognized 
standing and professional expertise in monetary or banking matters.46 
The Board members will be appointed, by common accord, by the 
Member governments for an eight-year non-renewable termY The 
appointments will be on the basis of a recommendation from the 
Council of Ministers and after consultations with the European Parlia-
ment and the Governing Council of the ECB.48 
The Governing Council will contain the six members constituting 
the Executive Board and the governors of the national central banks 
of the Member States.49 The terms of office shall be no less than five 
years, and all members of the Council will have one vote:'iO The decision 
to give each member one vote is significant in light of the objectives 
of both the EMU and the ECB: 
Weighted voting could have fostered the thinking that gover-
nors were primarily representing national interests and not 
equal members of a collegiate body charged with formulating 
42 See id. 
43 See EC TREATY art. 109m; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 424-25. 
44 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 1; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
45 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 9.3; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
46 See Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 11.1-.2; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
47 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 11.2; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
48 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 11.2; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
49 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 10.1; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
50 See Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 10.2, 14.2. However, there are some instances when members 
will have more than one vote. See id. art. 10.3. Specifically, "for any decisions taken under Articles 
28,29,30,32, 33 and 51, the votes in the Governing Council shall be weighted according to the 
national central banks' shares in the subscribed capital of the ECB." [d. 
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a common policy. Alliances of a few large members could 
then de facto have come to dominate decision-making.51 
The Governing Council will act by simple majority with the President 
having the casting vote in the event of a tie .. o2 The Governing Council 
will normally meet monthly, but in any event at least ten times per 
year.53 
The responsibilities of the Governing Council and the Executive 
Board are enunciated in Article 12.1 of the Protocol of the ESCB.54 
According to this article of the Protocol, the Governing Council shall 
formulate the monetary policy of the Community including, as appro-
priate, decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives, key in-
terest rates and the supply of reserves in the system, and shall establish 
the necessary guidelines for their implementation.55 The Executive 
Board shall implement monetary policy in accordance with the deci-
sions and guidelines laid down by the Governing Council,55 The na-
tional central banks will act in accordance with the guidelines and 
instructions of the Executive Board.57 
D. The Objectives, Functions and Independence of the ESCB and 
theECB 
The ESCB will have three specific objectives.58 As enunciated in the 
Protocol, the primary objective of the ESCB, which will be composed 
of the ECB and the national central banks, will be to maintain price 
stability.59 Furthermore, without adversely affecting the objective of 
price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies 
of the Community.50 The ESCB also will act consistently with free and 
competitive markets.51 
51 GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 397. 
52 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 10.2. 
53 See id. art. lP.5. 
54 See id. art. 12.l. 
55 See id.; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 398. 
56 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 12.1; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 398. 
57 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 12.1; GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 14, at 398. 
58 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2. 
59 See id. Unfortunately, there is not a precise definition yet of what is meant by price stability. 
Thygesen suggests three possible measures: (a) an index of average prices for traded goods and 
services in the EC; (b) a weighted index of consumer prices; and (c) an average of value-added 
deflators in the production of tradeables. See Charles Goodhart, A European Central Bank, in 
EUROPEAN BANKING 12, 27 (Andy Mullineux ed., 1992). 
60 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2. 
61 See id. 
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In order to avoid political influence and therefore achieve these 
common objectives, the ECB will function as an independent entity.62 
In general, central bankers argue that they are able to work more 
efficiently when they are insulated from partisan political influence.63 
Moreover, there is some empirical evidence that countries with a more 
independent central bank, like Germany, have succeeded in maintain-
ing price stability better than those with central banks that are more 
subject to the control of their central government, such as the UK. 64 
The Protocol of the ESCB explicitly provides for an independent 
central bank.65 Article 7 of the Protocol states that neither the ECB nor 
the national central banks will seek or take instructions from EU 
institutions or member governments, and that member governments 
will not try to influence the ECB.66 Consequently, although the presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers and a member of the Commission 
may attend meetings of the ECB Governing Council, they will not be 
allowed to vote. 67 
A prominent feature of an independent bank is that it generates its 
own revenue and does not rely on fiscal authority for its operations.68 
The ECB will be constructed in this regard like a private bank.69 Each 
national central bank will provide capital and will transfer foreign 
assets to the ECB, and the property of the ECB will be exempt from 
all forms of requisition or expropriation.70 The ECB will earn income 
on specifically designated assets and will distribute it to the member 
banks according to their capital shares.7! The ECB will, in sum, be 
financially independen t. 72 
In addition to the institutional independence of the ECB, the per-
sonal independence of central bankers from the administrations in 
62 See id. art. 7. "Note, however, that independence does not make the central bank an apolitical 
institution." FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 33-34 n.15. Charles Goodhart has pointed out 
that an independent central bank is forced to defend its policies continuously against pressure 
groups and in public debates and to seek coalitions in the political arena; a dependent central 
bank enjoys the government's protection against direct political attack. See id. In this sense, the 
position of independent central banks is more political than that of dependent central banks. 
See id. 
63 See Goodhart, supra note 59, at 24. 
64 See id. 
65 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 7. 
66 See id.; FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 34. 
67 See EC TREATY art. 109b; FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 34. 
68 See FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 36. 
69 See id. 
70 See Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 28-30; FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 36. 
71 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 32; FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 36. 
72 See FRAT/ANN! ET AL., supra note 5, at 36. 
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office is necessary to achieve the common objectives of the ECB.73 To 
this end, individual central bankers cannot be removed from office for 
the design and execution of monetary policy.74 Additional means to 
ensure independence are nonrenewability of terms, so that members 
of the ECB Executive Board will not be tempted to defer to the 
government in power, and staggering of terms, so that all the members 
are not appointed by the same administration.75 Appointments are 
staggered by giving members of the initial Executive Board different 
terms of office.76 The president of the first Executive Board will have 
a term of eight years, the vice-president a term of four years and the 
other members of the board terms of between five and eight years. 77 
The ESCB will undertake five main tasks: define and implement the 
monetary policy of the EU; conduct foreign exchange operations in 
accordance with the prevailing exchange rate regime of the EU; hold 
and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States; ensure 
the smooth operation of payment systems; and participate as necessary 
in the formulation, coordination and execution of policies relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system.78 In addition to these tasks, the ECB shall have certain 
advisory functions,79 Specifically, the ECB shall be consulted on any 
proposed EU act in its field of competence and by national authorities 
regarding any draft legislative provision in its field of competence. so 
The ECB's fields of competence are generally considered to entail all 
monetary, prudential, banking and financial matters.S1 Furthermore, 
the ECB may submit opinions to the appropriate EU institutions or 
bodies or to national authorities on matters in its fields of compe-
tence.S2 
In meeting its objectives and carrying out its general functions, 
the ESCB will have specific monetary operations and functions. s3 The 
73 See id. The ECB is "institutionally independent" because, as stipulated by Article 7 of the 
Protocol, it will not seek or take instructions from EU institutions or Member States. Protocol, 
supra note 7, art. 7. 
74 See id. art. 14.2; FRATIANNI ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. 
75 See Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 11.2, 50; FRATIANNI ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. 
76 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 50; FRATIANNI ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. 
77 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 50; FRATIANNI ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. 
78 See Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 3.1, 3.3. 
79 See id. art. 4. 
80 See EC TREATY art. 105(4); Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4. 
81 See Goodhart, supra note 59, at 16. 
82 SeeEC TREATY art. 105(4); Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4. 
83 See Protocol, supra note 7, ch. IV. 
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Governing Council will have the exclusive right to authorize the issu-
ance of lender tender within the EU.84 The ECB will be entitled to 
require credit institutions to hold minimum reserves on accounts with 
the ECB and with national central banks.85 The Governing Council also 
will lay down the regulations concerning the calculation and determi-
nation of the required minimum reserves.86 The ECB and the national 
central banks will be entitled to establish relations with banks and 
financial institutions in third party countries, and with international 
bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).87 The ESCB 
will be entitled to acquire and sell, spot and forward all types of foreign 
exchange assets and gold.88 The bank will also conduct all types of 
banking transactions with third countries, including borrowing and 
lending.89 Each national central bank will transfer to the ECB its for-
eign reserve assets, other than Member State currencies and ECUS.90 
The Governing Council shall decide upon the proportion to be called 
up by the ECB following its establishment and the amounts called up 
at later dates.9l Each national central bank will be credited with a claim 
equivalent to its contribution, and the Governing Council will deter-
mine the amount in which national central banks are renumerated.92 
The ECB may accept the pooling of IMF reserve positions and special 
drawing rights (SDRs) .93 
In order to carry out the functions of the ESCB, the ECB will make 
regulations, take decisions, deliver opinions and make recommenda-
tions.94 The acts or omissions of the ECB shall be open to review or 
84 See id. art. 16; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
85 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19.1; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
86 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19.1; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
R7 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 23; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
88 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 23; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
89 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 23; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
90 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 30.1; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. The ECU is an artificial 
European monetary unit. See BERMANN, supra note 1, at 1196. The value of the ECU is fixed as 
a composite of a "basket" of Member State currencies with weighted values one to another. See 
id. A macroeconomic calculation of the proportionate strength of the national economy under-
lying each State's currency is used in allocating weights to different currencies. See id. 
91 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 30.1; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
92 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 30.3; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
93 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 30.5; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 17. 
94 See EC TREATY art. 108a(l); Protocol, supra note 7, art. 34.1. The Treaty and Protocol define 
the various acts in this way: "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Recommendations and opinions shall 
have no binding force. A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is 
addressed." EC TREATY art. 108a(2). 
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interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) .95 In specific 
circumstances Member States, the Council, the Commission, the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) and natural or legal persons will have standing 
to bring suit before the ECJ.96 Furthermore, the ECB may institute 
proceedings before the ECJ in these same circumstances.97 A decision 
of the ECB to bring an action before the ECJ will be taken by the 
Governing Council,98 
II. DISCUSSION 
Since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
in 1952, economic integration has been actively sought by the Member 
States.99 Yet, full integration as desired by the original architects will 
never be realized without a monetary union and a centralized mone-
tary policy to provide stability and strength. Not unlike other states 
who have from time to time hastily pursued a governmental objective, 
the Member States of the ED have at times hastily pursued the objective 
of complete monetary union. Specifically, by requiring Member States 
to achieve strict convergence criteria for initiation into the third stage 
of economic and monetary union and by adopting a final and resolute 
deadline of January 1, 1999 for the establishment of this third stage, 
the Member States themselves have created a regime which may not 
be attainable. lOo Fortunately, the Member States have considered the 
legal ramifications of establishing a full monetary union by January 1, 
1999.1°1 As a result, the Member States have provided specific provi-
sions in the Treaty and the Protocol to deal with those situations which 
may arise if monetary union includes only several participating Mem-
ber States.102 These provisions furnish the ECB with the means to assert 
itself against attack from Member States with derogations. 103 
95 See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 35.1. 
96 See EC TREATY art. 173; see also discussion infra part II. For a complete discussion of the 
doctrine of direct effect, that is the instance when a natural or legal person has standing to sue 
an EU institution or a Member State, see generally BERMANN, supra note I, at 166. 
97 See EC TREATY art. 173; see also discussion infra part II. 
98 See id. art. 35.5. 
99 See generally BERMANN, supra note I, at 2. 
100 See EC TREATY art. 109j. 
101 See id. art. 173. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
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The Treaty on European Union provides that the Heads of State and 
Government will deem whether or not it is appropriate for the EU to 
enter the third stage of EMU. 104 If by the end of 1997 the date for the 
beginning of the third stage has not been set, the third stage will start 
automatically on January 1, 1999.105 It is conceivable that by the end of 
1998 only a few Member States will have met the convergence criteria. 
Regardless, even if only two of the Member States have fulfilled the 
necessary conditions by the end of 1998, EMU will be required to 
proceed. 106 Consequently, a situation may arise where only two Member 
States have transferred power over their monetary regimes from their 
national central banks to the EU institutions. 107 The rest of the Member 
States would be given derogations. !Os Member States with derogations 
as well as the national central banks of those states would be excluded 
from certain rights and obligations which arise from membership in 
the ESCB.109 
If this situation were to occur, it is conceivable that Member States 
with derogations, who essentially would be left out of the institutional 
framework of the monetary union, would be unsatisfied with certain 
aspects of the ECB's monetary policy. As a result, these Member States 
might attempt to pass and implement legislation through the Council 
of Ministers in the hope of changing monetary policy to suit their own 
particular needs. Such legislation would be hostile to the prerogatives 
of the ECB. For example, the Member States with derogations could 
pass a directive decreasing the level of capital which national central 
banks are required to maintain. Such action by the Council could 
vitiate a prior ECB directive stipulating the level of reserve require-
ments of national central banks. This scenario appears possible be-
cause only qualified majority voting, as opposed to unanimous consent 
by Member States, would be required for this type of legislation. llo 
If the Member States with derogations adopt banking legislation 
contrary to the ECB's prerogatives, the ECB could undertake measures 
to prevent such hostile action. To do this, the ECB would have to seek 
104 See id. art. 109j (3) . 
105 See EC TREATY art. 109j(4). 
106 See id. 
107 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 13, at *4.2. 
lOR See EC TREATY art. 109k(l). 
109 See id. art. 109k(3). 
110 See id. art. 148. 
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judicial recourse from the EC]. The ECB would undertake this measure 
by invoking Article 173 of the Treaty, which provides: 
[The European Court of Justice shall] have jurisdiction in 
actions brought by a member state, the Councilor the Com-
mission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this 
Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application of misuse 
of powers. The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same 
conditions in actions brought by the European Parliament 
and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their preroga-
tives.u1 
Therefore, in accordance with Article 173, the ECB may bring suit 
against the Council of Ministers if the Council, in enacting the banking 
legislation, infringed an essential procedural requirement.1l2 
In such a case, the ECB could argue that infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement occurred when the Council failed to consult 
the ECB about the proposed banking legislation. Article 105 (4) of the 
Treaty provides that "the ECB shall be consulted on any proposed 
Community act in its field of competence."113 If the banking legislation 
is in the field of competence of the ECB, the Council of Ministers will 
have infringed an essential procedural requirement.1l4 
The field of competence of the ECB will include monetary, pruden-
tial, banking and financial matters. ll5 Consequently, any legislation 
dealing with the reserve requirements for capital of national central 
banks will necessarily be within the field of competence of the ECB. 
As a result, such legislation enacted without the consent of the ECB 
would be struck down as violative of Article 173 of the Treaty.1l6 
Although the Member governments have provided specific provi-
sions in the Treaty and the Protocol to deal with situations that could 
arise if monetary union includes only several participating Member 
States, the Treaty should be amended to allow for a delay in estab-
lishing a full monetary union. ll7 For example, the Treaty could stipu-
late that the third stage of EMU will begin when either a majority or 
11l Id. art. 173. 
112 See id. 
ll3EC TREATY art. 105(4). 
114 See id. 
liS See id. art. 105; Goodhart, supra note 59, at 16. 
116 See EC TREATY art. 173. 
117 See id. 
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two-thirds of the Member States have met the convergence criteria. If 
the Treaty is not amended in such a manner, Member States with 
derogations, in the event that they have a qualified majority of the 
Council, will be able to adopt and implement legislation hostile to the 
prerogatives of the ECB. Hostile action taken by Member State govern-
ments in this regard will subsequently force the ECB to assert itself by 
means of legal recourse from the EC], an event which will generally 
cause inefficient and sometimes ineffective European monetary policy 
decision-making. By amending the Treaty to allow for a delay if the 
convergence criteria is not achieved by a majority of the Member 
States, however, impediments to efficient and effective monetary policy 
decision-making, such as the Council trying to pass legislation contrary 
to the prerogatives of the ECB, will be eliminated. 
CONCLUSION 
It is conceivable that a majority of the Member States, being unable 
to meet the strict convergence criteria, will be left out of the institu-
tional structure of the third stage of EMU. If this were to occur, it is 
also conceivable that these Member States, via the Council of Ministers, 
could adopt legislation contrary to the prerogatives of the ECB. If this 
legislation were to pass, the ECB could undertake measures to prevent 
such hostile action by Member States with derogations. Specifically, the 
ECB could invoke Article 173 of the Treaty and argue that infringe-
ment of an essential procedural requirement occurred when the Coun-
cil failed to consult the ECB about the proposed banking legislation. 
Because banking legislation is in the field of competence of the ECB, 
the EC] would strike down the legislation as violative of Article 173. 
Yet, hindrances to achieving efficient and effective common European 
monetary policy decision-making, caused by Member States with dero-
gations, can only be fully eliminated by amending the Treaty to allow 
for a delay in establishing a full monetary union. 
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